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FRANCHISOR STANDING TO SUE IN
TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONS
Private antitrust litigation presents the threshold question whether
a plaintiff has standing to maintain the action. Judicially fabricated
rules of standing have greatly narrowed the class of potential plaintiffs
from that suggested by the broad statutory language and apparent pur-
pose of the treble damage remedy. Whether appropriate or not, this
contraction appears to be a result of the courts' perceptions of the un-
desirable economic consequences attendant upon a widespread right of
action. This Comment examines the effects of current standing re-
quirements on a franchisor's attempt to prosecute a treble damage claim
when his franchisees first feel the impact of an antitrust violation.
I. THE PRESENT STANDING RULES AND PUBLIC POLICY
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws . . . shall recover threefold the dam-
ages by him sustained . ... '
The right of action created by the statute is not limited by its terms to
any particular class of plaintiffs, to persons injured "directly" as a
result of antitrust violations, or to plaintiffs alleging certain types of
violations.' The treble damage provision has been traditionally viewed
as an effort to enlist the private litigant in the public interest to enforce
the antitrust laws: the private plaintiff is an "ever-present threat to
deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the anti-
trust laws." a While acting to recover for an injury to himself, he
complements the government's enforcement policy by monitoring areas
of business activity beyond those usually falling under official scrutiny.
4
1 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) (emphasis added). Private treble damage suits were
originally authorized by § 7 of the Sherman Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat.
210, which was superseded by § 4 of the Clayton Act, ch. 25, § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
The private standing provision of the Sherman Act was substantially reenacted by the
Clayton Act but revised to extend the right of action to the Clayton Act's broader
sweep of proscribed activity.
2 It has been suggested, however, that "the nature of the violation may be a
rational basis for limiting liability. Perhaps a per se violation should entail wider
liability than one governed by the rule of reason . . ." Note, Standing to Sie
for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLUm. L. REv. 570,
587-88 (1964).
3 Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968);
see e.g., Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381
U.S. 311 (1965); Data Digests Inc. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 43 F.R.D. 386
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); Wham, Antitrust Treble-Damage Suits: The Government's Chief
Aid in Enforcement, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061 (1954).
4See Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir. 1957).
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Adopting this broad policy, the Supreme Court has counseled that
[t]his Court should not add requirements to burden the
private litigant beyond what is specifically set forth by Con-
gress in those laws.'
Moreover, the Court has suggested a very liberal standing rule:
[T]o state a claim upon which relief can be granted [under
section 4], allegations adequate to show a violation and, in a
private treble damage action, that the plaintiff was damaged
thereby are all the law requires.0
Fears of the consequences of allowing all possible plaintiffs to
maintain private antitrust actions, however, have cut away the lower
courts' adherence to these broad statements. Chief among these fears
is the apprehension that unlimited opportunities in the private sector
might result in pervasive and ruinous liability for defendants.' The
economic injury of an antitrust violation, when taken to include all
losses in the chain of production, distribution, and consumption, would
be considerable and, when trebled, might result in liability beyond that
reasonably justified by any expressed deterrent policy supporting the
treble damage provisions. The threefold remedy is undoubtedly
punitive, but its public policy purposes will not support broader applica-
tion than is necessary to ensure private enforcement of the antitrust
laws." Expansion beyond these purposes has given rise to judicial
objections that the remedy then serves only as an invitation to use
of attentuated claims to gain "windfall" treble damages.'
Courts have also pointed to administrative difficulties which would
arise from the great number of actions accruing from a widespread
right of action."0 Finally, the decisions evidence a hesitancy to allow
a cause of action where an alternate remedy will adequately protect
plaintiff's interest or where another plaintiff may sue to vindicate
public policy."
5 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957).
6 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660
(1961).
7 See, e.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910) ; Snow
Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956) ;
Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (prospect
of "thousands" of similar actions).
8 See Note, supra note 2, at 587; cf. Note, The Franchisor as Plaintiff in Treble
Damage Actions: An Antitritst Anomaly, 49 B.U.L. Rlv. 322, 339-41 (1969) (view-
ing the remedy as penal but largely intended to be compensatory).
9 Fiumara v. Texaco, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 544, 547 (E.D. Pa. 1962) ; Snow Crest
Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D. Mass. 1956);
Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 132, 142 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
10 See, e.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910); Snow
Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956);
Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
11 See, e.g., Peter v. Western Newspaper Union, 200 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1953);
Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 132, 140-41 (E.D. Pa. 1955); Westmoreland
Asbestos Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 30 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
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A. Present Standing Requirements
Alternative judicially fabricated standing rules narrowing the ap-
plication of the statute have emerged from these considerations. In
Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co.'" standing was denied to a stockholder-
employee of a photographic supply company allegedly ruined by de-
fendant photographic equipment manufacturer's illegal activities. The
court held that the company rather than the plaintiff in any of his
individual capacities had been substantially injured, that the right of
action properly vested in the supply company, and that the plaintiff's
injuries were not "directly resulting" from defendant's actions.'" This
"directness test" might be viewed narrowly as requiring "direct
competition" between the injured party and the wrongdoer. 4
A broader standing test was formulated in Conference of Studio
Unions v. Loew's, Inc.'5 Plaintiff, an organization of various labor
unions representing employees in the motion picture industry, com-
plained that a group of "major" motion picture producers had illegally
agreed to limit the latters' productions to long-run, exclusive engage-
ments at theaters owned by the "major" producers. This combination
had injured the remaining "independent" motion picture producers,
placing many of plaintiff's member employees out of work. Holding
that the plaintiff had no standing to maintain a treble damage action,
the court relied on a test requiring that plaintiff "show that he is within
that area of the economy which is endangered by a breakdown of com-
petitive conditions in a particular industry." 16
This "target area" test was amplified in Karseal Corp. v. Rich-
field Oil Corp.'7 Plaintiff, a manufacturer of automobile polish, sold
waxes to franchised distributors who resold the wax to independent
service stations. Defendant oil company sponsored the sale and dis-
tribution of automotive accessories, including wax products, which it
made available to service stations selling Richfield petroleum products.
Karseal alleged that Richfield had entered into exclusive dealing con-
tracts with the independent station owners and that the sale of Karseal
products had thereby been restricted, diminishing sales by the dis-
tributors. In granting Karseal standing to maintain a treble damage
action, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that if Karseal suffered economic
harm by being "hit" by the alleged violations, the dispositive question
became whether Karseal had been "aimed at" with sufficient precision.
12 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
13 Id. at 709.
14 See Note, supra note 2, at 582. Although courts, applying standing rules
more expansively, often refer to the directness of the injury, this Comment uses the
"directness test" to mean the strict standing rule premised on Loeb.
15 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952).
16Id. at 54-55.
17221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
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The coincidence of being hit and being "aimed at" was sufficient to
bring Karseal within the "target area" of the violation."8
Because Karseal marketed its product in "final form" rather than
selling "raw materials or component parts," the court inferred that
Richfield's "prevention or impeding of the sale of these competitive
products" was primarily directed at the manufacturers of competing
products,'" rather than franchised distributors. Richfield may not have
singled out Karseal, but the fact that an antitrust violation was directed
against a class of products and the fact that plaintiff had introduced a
finished product into that class was sufficient to establish that Karseal
had been "aimed at." Although the broader "target area" focus has
been commended as providing a more realistic and flexible test for
inquiring into the economic relationships among the protagonists in
the cases,"° it has often been construed to include only competitors of an
alleged violator,"' thus reducing the "target area" test to a form of the
"directness" test.'
B. The Most Suitable Plaintiff
Application of these standing tests has resulted in exclusion of
several classes of plaintiffs from the treble damage action. Employees,
officers, creditors, and stockholders of corporations are held to lack
standing to sue because of a diminution of their derivative interests in
companies harmed by antitrust violations.' Patentees and other
Is Id. at 365.
19 221 F.2d at 364; cf. Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d
383, 394 (6th Cir. 1962).
2OSee, e.g., Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 364 (9th
Cir. 1955) ("Classes or categories effected by a statute must rest on a realistic
basis.") ; Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a Treble-Damage
Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 691 (1963); Note, Antitrust-Private Treble
Damage Actions-Standing, 19 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 132 (1968); cf. Note, supra
note 2.
21 Compare Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.
1970) (owner of film block-booked by defendant was within the "target area" even
though not a direct supplier of films or a competitor of the theater owners forced by
defendant to accept block-booked films), with Field Productions, Inc. v. United
Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 432 F.2d 1010
(2d Cir. 1970) (plaintiff in the same circumstances as plaintiff in Mulvey could not
possibly be in "target area" since he was not a competitor). The scope of the
"target area" indicated by these decisions is characteristic of the two circuits. For
further development of the theory that commercial relations need not be present
between potential parties, see In re Multidistrict Antitrust Litigation Involving Motor
Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 479 BNA A.T.R.R. A-1 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
4, 1970).
22 Citing Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th
Cir. 1964), and Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1967), two
commentators found that "the Ninth Circuit has resolved 'target area' and 'proximate
cause' considerations by reference to the forseeability test." Alioto & Donnici,
Standing Requirements for Antitrust Plaintiffs: Judicially Created Exceptions to a
Clear Statutory Policy, 4 U.S.F.L. REv. 205, 213 (1970); cf. Note, The Pranchisor
as Plaintiff in Treble Damage Actions: An Antitrust Anomaly, 49 B.U.L. REv. 322,
343 (1969).
23 See, e.g., Peter v. Western Newspaper Union, 200 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1953);
Rossi v. McCloskey & Co., 149 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Gomberg v. Midvale
Co., 157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955): Cory v. Boston Ice Co., 207 F. 465 (D.
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licensors have no standing to sue for lost royalty payments arising
from antitrust damage to the business of their licensees 4 Less well-
settled are the cases denying suppliers standing to sue for profits lost
as a result of antitrust violations directed against their customers.2
One operational, though unarticulated, assumption in these cases
is that a more suitable plaintiff, one in more "direct" competition with
a violator, is available to maintain the antitrust action. In Snow Crest
Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc.26 defendant had entered into
exclusive dealing contracts with former customers of Snow Crest
Beverages. Both Snow Crest and Polar Cola, which sold approxi-
mately ninety percent of its output to Snow Crest, pursued the action.
The complaint was dismissed as to Polar Cola, which sought damages
for the diminution of sales resulting from defendant's interference with
Snow Crest's operation. The court did not intimate that Snow Crest,
a competitor of Recipe Foods, lacked standing to maintain the action.
Similarly, in Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co.
27
Volasco's supplier of raw materials, Volunteer Asphalt, sought treble
damages measured by its loss of sales formerly made to Volasco. The
court affirmed a directed verdict against Volunteer but did not suggest
that Volasco could not maintain the treble damage action.
In Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Products Corp.", plaintiff
held a patent on a product which it had licensed another to manu-
facture. Defendant's restrictive sales agreements with its retail outlets
had excluded plaintiff's patented product from the market. The court,
applying the "target area" principle, would have permitted an action
by the licensee whose interests had been directly damaged by the anti-
trust violations, but held that any damage to the patentee was too
remote to support the action.
These results have been explained by some commentators as
standing for the proposition that a competitor is always within the
"target area" and available to bring a section 4 action. 9 This avail-
ability of another plaintiff who could sue to effectuate the public policy
of private antitrust enforcement has made some courts willing to non-
Mass. 1913). But see Wilson v. Ringby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 699 (D. Colo.
1970) (that plaintiff's employer a party to the alleged violation held sufficient to make
plaintiff one "directly injured"); Data Digests, Inc. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 43
F.R.D. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ("directness" viewed as essentially a test of "proximate
cause").
2
4See. e.g., SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 943 (1969); Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Products
Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955).
2 5 See, e.g., Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383
(6th Cir. 1962) ; Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp.
907 (D. Mass. 1956) ; Sunbeam Corp. v. Payless Drug Stores, 113 F. Supp. 31 (N.D.
Cal. 1953). But see Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.
1955).
26 147 F. Supp. 907 (D. Mass. 1956).
27 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962).
28224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955).
29 See, e.g., Note, supra note 2, at 583-85.
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suit plaintiffs who were within an area of foreseeable harm and who
did in fact sustain measurable damages.3"
II. THE FRANCHISOR AS THE FIRST AVAILABLE PLAINTIFF
The judicial resolution of the causation issue in the standing cases
has been similarly applied to the franchise situation. Two hypothetical
franchise models make it clear, however, that the "target area" meta-
phor is an inappropriate rule of decision if employed without reference
to the unarticulated assumption that one plaintiff, cnly the one most
directly affected, must be allowed to bring a treble damage suit in
order to vindicate the public policy.31 In the first model, a single fran-
chisor licenses several franchisees whose only product or service is that
of the franchisor. Assuming an antitrust violation directed against the
franchisees in this single product, single franchise arrangement, the
individual franchisee is one easily-identified entity victimized to an
extent which should compel it to bring suit.
The standing requirements adequately vindicate public antitrust
policy in this model because the franchisee stands in a "direct" rela-
tionship with the alleged violator. A defendant's liability would be
unnecessarily expanded by extending standing to a large number of
plaintiffs seeking "windfall" judgments. This is true at least with
respect to a treble damage action; a case could be made for permitting
the franchisor to recover for actual damages,3" but such an action
would not involve the same policy considerations as a more restrictive
Clayton Act action.
Where there exists a plaintiff directly injured who can sue,
if he desires, the public policy can be vindicated by him and
it is neither necessary nor proper, from a public policy stand-
point, to extend the right to sue to those who have not
3OThe tendency to nonsuit plaintiffs when more easily identifiable and more
directly injured plaintiffs are available also explains cases in which lessors of theaters
have sought to maintain antitrust actions because of noncompetitive acts that reduced
lessees' profits and, because of percentage lease provisions, the lessors' rents. See,
e.g., Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1956) ; Harrison v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. Pa. 1953); cf. Lieberthal v.
North Country Lanes, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The consistency
with which courts have found plaintiff-lessors to lack standing can be explained by
the lessee's high degree of visibility as a party directly injured by the alleged viola-
tions. Those cases where the lessor was allowed to sue were characterized by
collusion between the lessee and the defendants, making the lessor the first available
plaintiff to maintain a private action. See, e.g., Congress Bldg. Corp. v. Loew's,
Inc., 246 F.2d 587 (7th Cir. 1957).
31 Indeed, in the franchising cases it might be questioned whether a stricter test
than "target area" is being applied. Two franchisors dealing in the same good or
service would clearly seem to be competitors, see note 28 supra. In keeping with
the thesis of this Comment, it might be contended that a "first available plaintiff"
test would better articulate the policy considerations applied by the judiciary than
the "target area" test and should accordingly replace it.32 See Note, The Fratcisor as Plaintiff in Treble Damage Actions: An Anti-
trust Anomaly, 49 B.U.L. Rzv. 322, 338-39 (1969) (suggesting that franchisor join
a tort claim to the antitrust action) ; note 21 supra.
702 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.119:696
actually been injured or whose injuries are sustained, if at
all, only through the person directly injured.
3
1
Because it fits the existing standing rules, this model appears also
to have presented little problem for the judiciary. At least one federal
appellate decision has denied standing to a franchisor seeking to sue
for antitrust violations directed against his franchisees. In Nationwide
Auto Appraiser Service, Inc. v. Association of Casualty and Surety
Companies 3 4 plaintiff had franchised four appraisal agencies in ex-
clusive territories. Defendant association's member insurance com-
panies agreed to use only the appraisal service designated by the
association in each region, thereby preventing plaintiff's franchisees
from obtaining any association business. Applying the "target area"
test to deny the franchisor standing, the Tenth Circuit concluded:
"[T]here is no product competition [between franchisor and de-
fendant] . . . . [T]he relationship more nearly approaches the sup-
plier cases, the licensee arrangements, or the union membership
cases." " The four franchisees were engaged solely in the damage
appraisal business and conducted that business only under the Nation-
wide franchise. 6 Thus, each was a readily-identifiable plaintiff who
had been clearly damaged by defendant's violations and who presumably
had sustained sufficient economic loss to motivate a treble damage
action. There was no need for the court to search further for a
plaintiff. Extension of standing to include the franchisor would only
increase the "windfall" recovery by multiplying the number of actions
and might impose ruinous liability on the defendant. In short, it
would extend the field of potential plaintiffs beyond that required for
private enforcement of the antitrust laws.37
The second model is the multiple franchise, multiple product ar-
rangement in which a single franchisee holds a number of franchises for
competing products.38 In Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co.,3 9 Billy
Baxter franchised four bottlers to manufacture and sell various soft-
drinks under its trademark. In addition to providing sales and promo-
tional expertise to the franchisees, Billy Baxter sold them flavor extracts
purchased from outside sources. The bottlers combined these extracts
with other ingredients according to a "secret formula" provided by the
franchisor to produce the finished soft-drinks, which were then sold to
33 E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST AcTIoNs § 4.02, at 25
(1965).
34382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967).
35 Id. at 929.
36 Id. at 926.
37 Nationwide has, however, been criticized in light of Karseal. An antitrust
violation immediately directed at the franchisees may have the purpose of eliminating
the franchisor from the market. Note, spra note 32, at 333-34.
38 C. RoSENIrEmL, THE LAw oF FRANcHISING § 131, at 222 (1970) ("It is not
unusual for the franchisee of one company to be also the franchisee of other companies.
This may be a form of multiple ownership within the same field of interest.").
3947 F.R.D. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 39
U.S.L.W. 3354 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1971) (No. 989).
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retail outlets. Royalties payable to Billy Baxter were determined by the
number of cases of beverages sold by the bottlers. Billy Baxter brought
suit under section 4 of the Clayton Act, charging that the defendants,
Coca-Cola Company and Canada Dry Corporation, had illegally per-
suaded retail outlets to discontinue the Billy Baxter beverage line, result-
ing in lost sales to the bottler-franchisees and, ultimately, lost royalty
revenues to Billy Baxter. Alleging that Coca-Cola "dominates the in-
dustry in the United States as a franchiser and bottler" and that Canada
Dry "occupies a similar, though lesser[,] position as a franchiser and
bottler of mixes," Billy Baxter contended that each defendant had agreed
to avoid competition in the other's "primary product lines" and had
"acted in concert to exclude plaintiff 'from the normal channels of inter-
state commerce.' "40 Defendants' motion for summary judgment was
granted by the district court.4 1 A divided court of appeals affirmed,
holding that plaintiff-franchisor did not have standing to sue for
"incidental" injuries and that he was not within the "target area"
of the alleged violations.'
Defining the "target area" of defendants' activities as the "market-
ing of bottled beverages," the court concluded that, because Billy
Baxter merely re-sold ingredients to its bottler-franchisees, it was
outside the "target area" and must be denied standing. In the mode
of Karseal's analysis, 43 that Billy Baxter was "hit" by the violations
would not suffice to meet the standing requirements; Billy Baxter must
show that it was "aimed at" with sufficient accuracy by the defendants
in order to place itself within the "target area." Even had Billy Baxter
demonstrated such marksmanship by defendants, it would have been
denied standing under the majority opinion:
[E]ven if the appellees [Coca-Cola and Canada Dry] violated
the law to help themselves or their franchisees at the expense
of the bottlers who sold Billy Baxter products, while knowing
that this would also be an effective way of depriving a rival
franchisor of royalties, the causal link between the type of
violation alleged and an appropriate plaintiff would still be
lacking in this suit.44
The "target area" test appears no more adequate to vindicate public
policy than the directness test if a knowing and willful antitrust
violation directed against a competitive market with entirely foreseeable
consequences to a business dealing within that market will not provide
standing for that business. This blanket rule operates to nonsuit all
franchisors rather than to examine the economic relationships on an
individual basis to locate an appropriate plaintiff.
40 Id. at 348 (quoting plaintiff's complaint).
41 Id.
42431 F.2d 183, 187-89 (2d Cir. 1970).
4 3 See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
44 431 F.2d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 1970).
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Billy Baxter is representative of the multiple franchise, multiple
product archetype. The court noted that three of the four franchisees
simply relinquished their franchises.' There is no indication that
these bottlers failed to remain in the beverage trade, and it can be
fairly supposed that they did not restrict their output to the Billy
Baxter line but had other beverages which continued in production
after Billy Baxter's declension. The elimination of Billy Baxter
beverages from the franchisees' product line would not injure them to
the extent that removal of the franchise business did in Nationwide.
The franchisee who is active in a market distinguished by cross
elasticity and who deals in a number of relatively undifferentiated,
competing products can meet demand by substituting one product for
another as a franchisee who is totally dependent on his franchisor's
product cannot." Indeed, faced with the potential loss of the antitrust
violator's franchise, a franchisee would be less than rational if he
brought suit. If the violator's franchise offers greater profits than the
victim's franchise, the franchisee's compelled choice between franchisor4
is unlikely to result in a suit: despite some loss of profit if the two
products are not perfectly interchangeable, the franchisee cannot risk
the loss of the violator's good will.
With this economic phenomenon removing the bottlers' motiva-
tion to bring an antitrust action, the court should have proceeded one
link down the chain and allowed the franchisor to maintain the treble
damage suit. The multiple product franchisee does not lose a signif-
icant amount of business by reason of an antitrust violation forcing him
to drop one particular franchised product line. Antitrust violations
excluding a particular brand from the relevant market may increase
sales of the remaining brands, leaving the franchisee relatively un-
scathed in terms of lost sales and profits. Thus, delineation of the
"target area" as suggested by Billy Baxter results in uncompensated
injury to the franchisor and denies public antitrust policy a private
plaintiff with the necessary economic interest and incentive to ensure
effective enforcement.
This result is not justified by any of the judicial concerns which
originally commanded imposition of the standing requirement. De-
fendant's liability is not extended needlessly but only so far as is neces-
sary to embrace a plaintiff appropriate to satisfy the role accorded the
private litigant in enforcement under the section. There is no multi-
45 Id. at 185.
4G D. WATsOx, PRiCE THFEORY AND ITS USES 100 (1963) ("Close substitutes
have high cross elasticity of demand.").
This ease of substitution, of course, means that a multiple franchisee will suffer
little financial loss when forced by the antitrust violator to make an either/or choice
between franchisors. The damaged franchisor, on the other hand, loses not the incre-
mental change caused by the slightly lowered demand but his entire volume of sales
to that franchisee. To the objection that this invites the ruinous liability feared by
the judiciary it can only be answered that at least one potential plaintiff must have
sustained substantial damages or § 4 will never provide the private attorney general
Congress sought.
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plicity of actions; merely one instead of none. Denying standing to
the franchisor removes the threat of private enforcement and works
against the announced policy of the antitrust laws. Rejecting the
franchisor's claim to standing would result in a "windfall" for the
defendant, who would gather the fruits of his prohibited conduct with
no threat of a private action, or, at least, without the threat of an action
in which the award would be significant, even when trebled. 7
In another context, the Supreme Court has adopted the rationale
this Comment advances in support of a liberal construction of the
standing prerequisites to maintaining private antitrust litigation:
In addition, if buyers are subject to the passing-on de-
fense, those who buy from them would also have to meet the
challenge that they passed on the higher price to their cus-
tomers. These ultimate consumers, in today's case the buyers
of single pairs of shoes, would have only a tiny stake in a
lawsuit and little interest in attempting a class action. In
consequence, those who violate the antitrust laws by price
fixing or monopolizing would retain the fruits of their
illegality because no one was available who would bring suit
against them. Treble-damage actions, the importance of
which the Court has many times emphasized, would be sub-
stantially reduced in effectiveness.4"
It is precisely this exclusion of the logical plaintiff which Billy
Baxter accomplishes. If the prevailing "target area" rationale does in
fact best serve antitrust policy,49 courts must look to the considerations
underlying its application and scrutinize the matrix of economic rela-
tionships before dismissing a case for want of standing."  In Billy
Baxter the franchisor should at least have survived the preliminary
standing challenge.
47 See Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 196 (2d Cir. 1970)
(Waterman, J., dissenting).
48 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Show Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968)
(emphasis changed).
49 The Supreme Court has not expressly sanctioned or disapproved the test.
Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952) ; accord, Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions,
433 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1970); Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480, 485
(9th Cir. 1967). The Ninth Circuit seems to have adopted considerably less restric-
tive standing requirements. See notes 20 & 21 supra.
60 These considerations, of course, should be generally applicable to all cases
where the "target area" test is to be applied; the supplier cases, supra notes 25-27 &
accompanying text, in particular seem to lend themselves to an analysis similar to
that found to apply to the multiple franchise, multiple product model.
